

A Tradition of Stewardship A Commitment to Service

NAPA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY 2024-2025 April 23, 2025 FINAL REPORT

The Votes Are In - and Were Counted Securely and Accurately

A Look Inside Napa County's 2024 General Election Process

SUMMARY

Questions regarding the validity of elections across the United States grew out of public claims of fraud, miscounts and unlawful behavior related to the 2020 General Election. In response, the 2024-2025 Napa County Civil Grand Jury investigated the safety, accuracy, and security of the election process for the 2024 General Election in Napa County.

The Civil Grand Jury conducted its investigation using three methods: interviews, research, and first-person observations of the election processes and procedures. As a result of this investigation, the Civil Grand Jury determined that the 2024 election process in Napa County followed local, state and federal regulations and laws and was safe, secure, and executed with integrity.

After a thorough review of the detailed regulations and procedures performed by and under the supervision of Napa County's Registrar of Voters, the Civil Grand Jury found the County Elections staff to be dedicated and committed to completing their duties, exhibiting expert knowledge of the regulations and laws governing their work.

The observations and detailed descriptions in the report validate the integrity of the elections in Napa County.

The Civil Grand Jury finds:

- Napa County's 2024 General Election was safe, secure, and performed with integrity.
- The election procedures were followed in accordance with the law.
- The legally required manual audit of the election was secure and accurate.
- The confidentiality of a voter's ballot was maintained and protected throughout the entire election process.
- No eligible vote, cast in the prescribed manner, was found to be uncounted.
- The Napa County election computer systems were secure.
- The Voter Registration Database was maintained accurately.
- The election process was transparent, and observers were welcomed and encouraged to witness the activity.
- The Napa County Elections Division's office workspace was inadequate and warrants improvement.
- Napa County Elections Division website lacked information and organization to assist voters and the community in an easy-to-understand format.
- Napa County Elections Division did not maintain its own social media accounts as required by the Napa County Social Media Use Policy, leading to personnel utilizing personal accounts for county business.
- Napa County Elections Division outreach lacked effective strategies to target soon-to-be-of-age eligible voters.

BACKGROUND

The Napa County Civil Grand Jury chose to investigate the safety, accuracy, and security of the 2024 General Election process in Napa County due to public accusations of fraud, miscounts, and unlawful behavior related to the 2020 General Election across the country.

The 2024 General Election in Napa County, which occurred on November 5, 2024, included 60 voting contests spread over 206 different precincts. Of the 85,150 registered voters in Napa County, 66,634 votes were cast, totaling approximately 78% of registered voters. While most Napa County voters chose mail-in ballots (61,783), live ballots totaled 4,851.

The primary focus of the Civil Grand Jury investigation was centered on addressing a series of questions:

- Are poll books maintained accurately?
- Can a person vote twice?
- Can a person vote in the place of someone else?
- Are ballots protected and kept confidential?
- Are computer systems used in voting secure?
- Is every vote counted?

METHODOLOGY

Civil Grand Jury members researched local, state, and federal laws and regulations for elections. These laws and regulations described local procedures in detail and limited variation or interpretation of the process.

The Civil Grand Jury conducted interviews with members of the Napa County Elections Division staff and Napa County employees about their general roles and responsibilities during an election in Napa County. Jury members also observed election activities in person. The Civil Grand Jury selected voting centers in Napa County to observe the facilities, processes, and procedures, and observed all the at-large processes at the Napa County Elections Division office on First Street in Napa.

The investigation also included monitoring of Napa County Elections Division policy and procedures and confirmed compliance with state and federal law.

¹ November 5, 2024 General Election Napa County Election Division Final Certified Results, available via: https://www.countyofnapa.org/DocumentCenter/View/35129/Final-Certified-Summary-Report-2024-PDF

² Napa County Elections Division, Vote Analysis, November 5, 2024 General Election.

DISCUSSION

Accurate Maintenance of Poll Books

Voter Registration

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (Motor Voter Act) permitted voters to update their voter registration, specifically their address, upon renewing or obtaining a driver's license or REAL ID from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The Act removes an important roadblock, increasing voter accessibility for eligible voters.³

Voters may also register at the California Secretary of State's Online Voter Registration page or at the Napa County Elections Division office. A first-time voter needs to provide a valid driver's license, REAL ID or the last four digits of their Social Security Number to confirm their United States citizenship and residency in Napa County.

All registered voters receive, via the United States Postal Service (USPS), their mail-in ballot sent to their last known address. Updates to a voter's address may be resolved via the DMV, USPS or directly with the Napa County Elections Division, depending upon the circumstances. Any mail-in ballots returned to the Elections Division due to an address discrepancy await the voter's initiative to resolve the issue.

Voter Registration Database

The Voter Registration Database contains registered voter information such as name, address, voting precinct, if the voter was issued a mail-in ballot, and if identification needs to be verified.⁴ The accuracy of the Napa County Voter Registration Database is maintained with monthly updates from information provided by the DMV, Department of Health and Human Services deceased persons update, and from the Department of Corrections for those recently incarcerated with a felony conviction. This database maintains changes of address, changes based on minimum voting age (currently 18), deaths, and incarcerations.⁵

https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/poll-books; and California Secretary of State, Statewide Voter Registration Systems, accessed via:

https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/statewide-voter-registration-system

https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/poll-books; and California Secretary of State, Statewide Voter Registration Systems, accessed via:

 $\frac{https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/statewide-voter-registration-system$

³ California National Voter Registration Act Manual, accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voter-registration/nvra/laws-standards/nvra-manual

⁴ California Secretary of State, Electronic Poll Books, accessed via:

⁵ California Secretary of State, Electronic Poll Books, accessed via:

Designated Voter Registration database computers at all vote centers are on a secure, closed network and only have access to the database information.⁶

Generation of Ballots

Napa County Elections Division staff worked with a state approved vendor to generate ballots. This vendor received a list of names and addresses for registered voters from the Voter Registration Database to print and mail ballots and return envelopes. Voters could return completed ballots by mail, in person to the Elections Office, or at an official ballot drop off location.

Mail-in envelopes have barcodes that are used to identify an individual voter's envelope. Only the first ballot cast by a voter, based on the date received by Elections Office personnel, whether by mail, in person at the Elections Office, or at an official ballot drop off location, are considered the eligible ballot that moves forward to be counted.⁷

Voting Twice: Is It Possible?

Voting In-Person

To assist in the authentication of the process, a selected number of Civil Grand Jury members voted in-person to observe the processes for a physical ballot and an electronic marked ballot. In both scenarios, the voter completed a voter identification form to allow the Voter Registration Database staff at the Vote Center to verify the address and voting precinct. The voter was able select either a paper ballot or an electronic marking ballot. See examples in Appendix A and Appendix B.

Electronic ballots were read by a machine connected only to its own printer. The machine was activated by a microchipped card, which an eligible voter acquired from election staff at the time of voting.

Mail-in Ballots

registration/vote-mail

The instructions contained in the mail-in ballot included how to sign and return the envelope via USPS or at a drop-box location. This signature was critical to voter identification and was described in the signature verification section. Ballots returned via USPS followed USPS procedures documented and described via: https://about.usps.com/what/government-services/election-mail/.

⁶ California Secretary of State, Statewide Voter Registration Systems, accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/statewide-voter-registration-system; and California Secretary of State, Electronic Poll Books, accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/poll-books; and California Secretary of State, Voter's Choice Act, accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voter-

⁷ California Secretary of State, Electronic Poll Books, accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/poll-books and California Secretary of State, Statewide Voter Registration Systems, accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/statewide-voter-registration-system

The Napa County Registrar of Voters confirmed receipt from the USPS any election mail postmarked by the election deadline for seven days following Election Day. This ensured that voters whose ballots may have had a flaw or required signature verification had an opportunity to correct the issue in time to have their ballots counted.

Ballot Drop Boxes and Chain of Custody

Drop box locations were determined by the County Registrar of Voters using population, geographic area, voter convenience, proximity to public transportation, security and funding data. The County Registrar of Voters determined that 11 drop box locations throughout the County were warranted in 2024.

The County Registrar of Voters was responsible for establishing drop-box collection of ballots and chain of custody procedures. Napa County followed the prescribed procedures set forth by the Secretary of State, including chain of custody for all ballot collections.¹⁰

Voters were also able to bring their mail-in ballot to any vote center to vote using a 'live' ballot. This process involved 'spoiling' the mail-in ballot to prevent two ballots being cast by one voter. A vote center employee confirmed the precinct of the voter and eliminated or "spoiled" their mail-in ballot from being counted. This voter information was immediately updated in the Voter Registration Database.

Preventing Casting a Ballot That's Not Your Own

Sorting Ballots

In a dedicated room, completed ballots held within their mail-in envelopes were stored in trays for processing. The sorting process of mail-in envelopes occurred in multiple steps resulting in an organization by precinct. This precinct organization was not required, but Napa County chose to do so to make the mandated manual recount process more efficient.

Signature Verification

Signature verification was performed by Elections Division staff and occurred on desktop computers on a closed network. Software facilitated the California Secretary of State's regulations to ensure a consistent approach to signature verification. The regulations required that elections officials "must compare the signature on a voted vote-by-mail envelope...to the voter's signature(s) in the voter's registration record prior to counting a ballot. 12

⁸ California Secretary of State, Vote-by-Mail Ballot Drop Boxes and Vote-by-Mail Drop-Off Locations, accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/vote-mail-ballot-drop-boxes-and-drop-locations

⁹ Napa County, Drop Box Locations, accessed via: https://www.countyofnapa.org/2355/Drop-Box-Locations
¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ California Secretary of State, Signature Verification, Ballot Processing, and Ballot Counting (Emergency Regulations), accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/signature-verification-ballot-processing-and-ballot-counting-emergency-regulations
¹² Ibid.

The overall training and process of signature verification followed the California Secretary of State's Signature Verification code of regulations that states: "examination of the signature shall be liberally construed in the favor of the voter." Signature verification cards and letters were sent out by Napa County Elections Division as soon as they received mail-in ballots with problematic signatures. This process of 'curing' the signature required the voter to return the card to the Elections Division Office with a resolved signature. This card had to be received by the elections official no later than 5 PM two days prior to the certification of the election. Until the signature was verified, the mail-in envelope containing the ballot was set aside and remained in the secure sorting room.

Out of the 61,783 votes cast by mail-in ballot for 2024 General Election in Napa County, 244 signatures were challenged without curing the signature, for a 99.6% signature verification rate.¹⁵

Ballots are Confidential and Protected

Boards/Canvassing

The boards/canvassing process began with the delivery of a tray of mail-in envelopes sorted by voting precinct to groups of three or four individuals. As prescribed by regulation, a specifically sequenced process separated the ballots from their mail-in envelopes and prepared the ballots for the scanning and counting of votes. Any damaged ballots that would prevent a successful scan were set aside for duplication (see process as described below). Ballots were separated from the envelopes and no longer had voter information. They were protected and sealed in rooms that were locked, alarmed, and had constant video coverage. At the end of the boards/canvassing, sealed boxes of ballots, organized by precinct, were delivered to the counting room.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ California Legislative Information: Elections Code accessed via: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC§ionNum=3019

¹⁵ Napa County Elections Division, Vote Analysis, November 5, 2024 General Election.

Voting Computer Security

Preparation for Counting Ballots

In preparation for the election, Napa County performed its logic and accuracy quality assurance process on the official counting/scanning equipment. In accordance with the law and California Secretary of State regulations, testing was completed on February 9, 2024, and documented the equipment functioning as expected in preparation for the 2024 General Election.¹⁶

Napa County utilized Dominion Voting Systems for its counting/scanning and ballot adjudication processes. This system was approved by the California Secretary of State, having met specific requirements.¹⁷ Had there been any problems during the election counting/scanning of ballots, the vendor's technical staff were available for assistance.

Every Vote is Counted

Ballot Counting

Sealed boxes of ballots from the boards/canvassing process were opened by authorized staff engaged in the scanning. In most cases, if a ballot was rejected by the scanner due to errors reading the tick marks, tears, crease or fold problems, the individual conducting the scanning resolved the problem. An example ballot is included in Appendix B. If a ballot still could not be scanned, the Elections personnel conducting the scanning removed the page(s) and placed them in the duplication bag. To maintain tracking and accountability, the Elections staff made a note updating the physical count for the box seal.

If valid, the contest was tallied and maintained by the system until a report was generated by a user. No vote count was available until manually requested, which occurred during reporting. If a contest had an invalid vote such as an over-vote, where a voter voted for more than the choices available in a contest, the vote was not counted for that specific contest, and its scan was placed in a watch folder for the ballot adjudication process.

Ballot Adjudication

Adjudication is defined: "to decide the correctness of a ballot and accept or deny the ballot."¹⁸ The adjudication process was performed by trained Elections staff. Staff selected a batch number of scanned ballots to perform the adjudication. The Civil Grand Jury found the Vote Counting Standards, established by the California Secretary of

 $\underline{https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/statewide-voter-registration-system}$

¹⁶ California Secretary of State, Office of Voting Systems Technology Assessment, County Clerk/Registrar of Voters (CC/ROV) Memorandum # 24043, RE: Voting Systems: Logic and Accuracy Test Reporting, January 25, 2024, accessed via: https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ccrov/2024/january/24043nr.pdf

¹⁷ California Secretary of State, Certified Voting Technologies Used by County, accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/frequently-requested-information/voting-systems-used-counties

 $^{^{\}rm 18}$ California Secretary of State, Statewide Voter Registration Systems, accessed via:

State, to be useful in researching ballot adjudication, and a relevant excerpt is available in Appendix C.

The standards for valid and invalid ballots are detailed. According to regulation, there are more reasons to honor the intent of the voter than to mark a contest invalid. ¹⁹ The Civil Grand Jury found Napa County Elections Division performed the adjudication process in accordance with the law.

Duplication of a Ballot

"(A) duplicated ballot is a ballot which is a true copy of the originally cast ballot. It is created when damage, improper marking or some other action/defect prevents the original ballot from being read by a ballot tabulating machine and is used to properly process and count the votes originally cast by the voter. A duplicated ballot also is necessary for a ballot cast using a remote accessible vote-by-mail ballot."²⁰

Napa County Elections Division staff operated in a group of four people when it was necessary to duplicate ballots using electronic marking machines. One person held and read aloud the original ballot. A second individual witnessed the accuracy of what was stated as the vote. A third individual stood at the electronic marking machine and marked the called-out vote. A fourth individual confirmed the mark was accurate. For the 2024 General Election, Napa County duplicated 2,411 ballots, or 3.62% of those returned.²¹

Reporting Results

Napa County, like all other California counties, provided elections results in a series of reporting instances. The first report for Napa County was on election night at 8:01 p.m. local time and included all ballots cast in-person on election day. This initial report included early voting ballots deposited at vote centers or drop boxes, as well as mail-in ballots received by noon the Saturday before election day. Reporting thereafter was provided at determined increments based upon volume of ballots received until every identified eligible vote was counted.

The results were made available on the Napa County Elections Division website. The results were not easy to find and required following a small link among regular text to get to the reporting page. The Civil Grand Jury recommends a modernization review of the Elections Division website. This is explored further in the website section of the report.

 ¹⁹ California Secretary of State, Signature Verification, Ballot Processing, and Ballot Counting (Emergency Regulations), accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations)
 California Secretary of State, Signature Verification, Ballot Processing, and Ballot Counting (Emergency Regulations), accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/signature-verification-ballot-processing-and-ballot-counting-emergency-regulations
 Napa County Elections Division, Vote Analysis, November 5, 2024 General Election.

Of the 85,150 registered voters in Napa County, 66,634 cast votes, which was a 78% turnout for the 2024 General Election. No votes were miscounted by the electronic counting machines in service in Napa County and the manual tally, as required by law, matched the electronic count as well.²²

Manual Recount or 1% Manual Tally Audit

A manual recount, also known as the one percent manual tally, has been required by the California Secretary of State since 1998.²³ The manual recount is a one percent count of every contest in a randomly generated one percent of precincts. The manual recount and random generation were only accessed after all identified eligible votes were counted. The total number of ballots audited across these two categories was 3,597 ballots, or 5.40% of the overall ballots for the 2024 General Election.²⁴

The manual tally process, observed by Civil Grand Jury members, was followed in accordance with the law. For the 2024 General Election, "Napa County did not have any discrepancies on the Manual Tally" and achieved 100% accuracy.²⁵

Election Certification

All election results were required to be complete and certified by December 3, 2024, within 30 days of election day. ²⁶ The Napa County Registrar of Voters sent a certified statement, available in Appendix D, to the California Secretary of State once all eligible ballots had been counted. Certified results were also posted on the County's website.

Records Management

All digital and physical election documentation and materials, including ballots and mailin envelopes, were sent to the Napa County Records Center. The records management process at the Napa County Records Center is set forth by the California Secretary of State and requires retention for 22 months after the certification of the election on December 3, 2024.²⁷

https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/one-percent-manual-tally; and California Elections Code 15360, One Percent Manual Tally [15360-15360.], accessed via: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC§ionNum=15360

https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/ballot-counting; and California Secretary of State, News Release: "California's Vote Counting Process:

By Law, Counting Can Take Up to 30 Days to Ensure Voters' Rights and Integrity of Elections", November 15, 2022, accessed via: <a href="https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2022-news-releases-and-advisories/californias-vote-counting-process-law-counting-can-take-30-days-ensure-voters-rights-and-integrity-elections

California Secretary of State, Records Management Handbook, accessed via:

https://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/records-management-and-appraisal/records-management-handbook

²² Report of 1% Manual Tally, Napa County, December 3, 2024, appendix E.

²³ California Secretary of State, One Percent Manual Tally, accessed via:

²⁴ Napa County Elections Division, Vote Analysis, November 5, 2024 General Election.

²⁵ Report of 1% Manual Tally, Napa County, December 3, 2024, appendix E.

²⁶ California Secretary of State, Ballot Counting, accessed via:

²⁷ California Secretary of State, County Clerk/Registrar of Voters (CC/ROV) Memorandum # 22216, RE: General Election: Preservation of Election Materials, September 9, 2022, accessed via: https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ccrov/2022/september/22216sr.pdf

Outreach

As a requirement of the Voter's Choice Act of 2016, California counties must develop an Election Administration Plan (EAP) or outreach plan in collaboration with the public.²⁸ This plan also sets forth how county elections officials utilize social media, newspapers, mail, radio, and television to disseminate voter information. Napa County's EAP can be accessed via: https://www.countyofnapa.org/2242/Election-Administration-Plan.

Napa County Elections Division is required to use Napa County's official government social media accounts. However, in 2024, it was observed that the Napa County Registrar of Voters used personal social media accounts for some voter outreach. Issues with Napa County Elections Division social media presence was previously documented in a 2020-2021 Napa County Civil Grand Jury Report.²⁹

Napa County's Social Media Use Policy states that "Napa County Department Heads...must designate authorized Social Media administrators." ³⁰

The Civil Grand Jury recommends Napa County Elections Division appoint a social media administrator to configure social media accounts for the division, removing any personal accounts from involvement in official county business.

The Civil Grand Jury further recommends that additional outreach to juveniles or those coming of voting age, be incorporated into future iterations of the Napa County EAP. While California Election Code 2105.7 provides for such outreach by the Napa County Juvenile Detention Center, that effort is restricted to those detained and, as such, has limited effect. General voter information should be provided by the Napa County Elections Office for public posting at juvenile locations throughout the county, including community centers and other public and event spaces, to reach more individuals approaching voting age.

Napa County Elections Website

The Civil Grand Jury review of the Napa County Elections website found the site lacked cohesive information and proper links to related material, as well as other challenges to accessing information. Additionally, documentation was found on pages not accessible to or from the Elections pages.

²⁸ California Secretary of State, Voter's Choice Act, accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voter-registration/vote-mail

²⁹ Napa County Civil Grand Jury, Inquiry Report, 2019-2020, Napa County Elections: Results You Can Count On, accessed via: https://www.napa.courts.ca.gov/system/files/napa-county-elections-results-you-can-count-c.pdf

³⁰ Napa County Social Media Use Policy, accessed via: https://services.countyofnapa.org/AgendaNet/DownloadDocument.aspx?type=BOS&doctype=ATTACHMEN T&id=22227

The Elections website is operated by Napa County's webmaster within Countywide Communications Division and would benefit from updated website standards as recommended in the 2023-2024 Civil Grand Jury Report.³¹

While Elections Division staff demonstrated expert knowledge, backed up by process and procedural documentation held under statute and other regulations, the website presented little of this information to the public. The Civil Grand Jury recommends a review, reorganization and a modernization of the Elections content and website occur.

Accessibility in Voting

While the Civil Grand Jury did not observe all voting center locations in Napa County, those that were observed met accessibility requirements for individuals with mobility issues. Civil Grand Jury members also observed voting materials in a variety of languages. Napa County provided volunteers who made recommendations to improve voter access for voting and to elections materials for voters with disabilities or those with lower English proficiency. The Voting Accessibility Advisory and Language Accessibility Advisory Committee had input and collaboration with the Napa County Elections Division. Additional information can be found at: https://www.countyofnapa.org/401/Get-Involved.

Remote Accessible Vote-by-Mail Ballot

Remote voting has been available for many years with expansions to cover military, overseas voters, and voters with disabilities. Different than a mail-in ballot, the Remote Accessible Vote-by-Mail or RAVBM is mainly for those requiring assistance in reading and/or marking their ballots. RAVBM permits these voters to vote privately and independently without voting via the internet. Napa County Elections Division has specific procedures related to the RAVBM, and they are in accordance with the law.³²

Napa County Elections Division Workspace

Civil Grand Jury members observed multiple activities on different days throughout the election process at the Elections Office on Second Street in Napa. During these visits, jury members noted workspace was limited, especially for rooms dedicated to perform the complex functions of elections procedures. The Civil Grand Jury recommends the Napa County Board of Supervisors, in collaboration with the Registrar of Voters, review workspace requirements and establish a plan for addressing shortcomings with the present work environment.

³¹ Napa County Civil Grand Jury, 2023-2024, Napa County's Communication with Its Citizens, accessed via: https://www.napa.courts.ca.gov/system/files/general/napa-countys-communication-its-citizens.pdf
³² California Secretary of State, Ballot Counting, accessed via:

https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/ballot-counting; and California Secretary of State, Remote Accessible Vote-By-Mail (RAVBM), accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-resources/remote-accessible-vote-mail

FINDINGS

The Civil Grand Jury finds:

- F1. Napa County's 2024 General Election was safe, secure, and performed with integrity.
- F2. The 2024 election procedures were followed in accordance with the law.
- F3. No eligible vote cast in the prescribed manner was found to be uncounted.
- F4. The Napa County election computer systems were secure.
- F5. The Voter Registration Database was maintained accurately.
- F6. The confidentiality of a voter's ballot was maintained and protected throughout the entire election process.
- F7. The legally required manual audit of the election was secure and accurate.
- F8. The election process was transparent, and observers were welcomed and encouraged to witness the activity.
- F9. The Napa County Elections Division's office workspace was inadequate and warrants improvement.
- F10. Napa County Elections Division website is lacking information and organization to assist voters and the community in an easy-to-understand format.
- F11. Napa County Elections Division did not maintain its own social media accounts as required by the Napa County Social Media Use Policy, leading to personnel utilizing personal accounts for county business.
- F12. Napa County Elections Division outreach failed to use effective strategies to target soon-to-be-of-age eligible voters.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Civil Grand Jury recommends:

- R1. The Napa County Board of Supervisors examine the need to upgrade the Napa Elections Office to ensure adequate office workspace for future elections. This examination should include collaboration with and input from the Napa County Elections Division staff, and should occur within 60 days, with a report of recommendations released in 45 days.
- R2. The Napa County Elections Division review its website for modernization and standards to help the organization of information. The Elections website should include the public reports required by the state. Recommendation for a review and generation of areas of improvement of the website be within 60 days and implementation of changes within 180 days from the identification of the areas of improvement.
- R3. The Napa County Elections Division set up and maintain its own social media accounts to distribute voter information, and staff should refrain from using personal

accounts to communicate official county business. Both of these recommendations should be implemented within 90 days.

R4. The Napa County Elections Division examine its outreach program directed to those coming of age to vote. This outreach should be added to the next iteration of the Napa County Election Administration Plan (EAP). Materials should be readily available and circulated within 30 days.

COMMENDATIONS

The Civil Grand Jury commends the Napa County Elections Division Staff and Registrar of Voters. These individuals executed their duties expertly and conducted their operations in a manner that ensured the elections were safe, secure, and conducted in accordance with the law and procedures. The Elections Division staff governed the process with integrity and transparency.

REQUIRED RESPONSES

The Civil Grand Jury requires the Napa County Board of Supervisors to respond to F9 & R1.

The Civil Grand Jury requires the Napa County Registrar of Voters to respond to F9, F10, F11, F12 and R1, R2, R3, and R4.

INVITED RESPONSES

The Civil Grand Jury invites, but does not require, the Napa County Countywide Communications Division (or the Public Information Officer) to respond to F10 and F11 and R2 and R3.


APPENDIX A:

QR Code Example (Spoiled) Ballot from Electronic Marking Machine

OFFICIAL BALLOT GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2024 COUNTY OF NAPA 4TH CONGRESSIONAL, 3RD STATE SENATE, 4TH ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS Instructions to Voters: If you make a mistake, contact Elections Staff before placing your ballot in the envelope or ballot box.


2117551

Ballot Type 13



APPENDIX B:

Example Ballot Card with Timing Ticks Marks and Scanning Target



APPENDIX C:

Vote Counting Standards³³

20982. General Vote Counting Standards

The following general standards shall apply in the counting of all ballots and votes, regardless of the voting system used, for both the initial count and for any recount.

A ballot that is not marked as provided by law must be segregated and counted in the manner directed by the elections official. Any ballot that contains personal information, or that is torn, bent, or mutilated shall be segregated as directed by the elections official and a duplicate ballot shall be prepared pursuant to Elections Code section 15210.

A ballot that contains marks or markings not related to an indication of the vote choice for a contest and that are not personal information shall be counted. Duplication is not required unless the ballot contains personal information, or the condition of the ballot or markings on the ballot interfere with the ability of the vote tabulation equipment to tally the ballot.

A vote for any candidate or ballot measure shall not be rejected solely because the voter failed to follow instructions for marking the ballot. If, for any reason, it is impossible to determine the choice of the voter for any candidate or ballot measure, the vote for that candidate or ballot measure shall be considered void.

A mark is considered valid when it is clear that it represents the voter's choice and is the technique consistently used by the voter to indicate his or her selections.

- 1. Such marks may include, but are not limited to, properly filled-in voting position targets, checkmarks, X's, circles, completed arrows, or any other clear indication of the voter's choice, such as the word "yes" next to a candidate's name or a voting position target for a ballot measure.
- 2. Conversely, a mark crossed out by the voter, or the word "no" next to a candidate's name or a voting position target for a ballot measure shall not be considered to be a valid vote but will, instead, be deemed an indication that the voter did not choose to cast a vote for that candidate or measure.
- 3. In determining the validity of a partially filled-in voting position target, the consistency of a voter's marks on the entire ballot shall be taken into consideration. A "hesitation mark" such as a dot in the voting position target shall not be considered a valid mark unless it is demonstrated that the voter consistently marked his or her ballot in such a manner.

If a contest is marked with more choices than there are offices to be filled or measures that may prevail, the vote shall not be counted for that contest, but shall be counted in

³³ California Secretary of State, Signature Verification, Ballot Processing, and Ballot Counting (Emergency Regulations), accessed via: https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/signature-verification-ballot-processing-and-ballot-counting-emergency-regulations

all other contests in which there is no overvote and the voter's choice can be clearly determined.

If a contest is marked with fewer choices than there are offices to be filled or measures that may prevail, the vote choice(s) for all otherwise properly marked candidates or measures shall be counted.

Write-in votes shall be counted pursuant to the provisions established in Elections Code sections 14420, 15342 and 15342.5.

APPENDIX D:

Napa County Certification of Results

CERTIFICATION OF
COUNTY CLERK/REGISTRAR OF VOTERS OF THE
RESULTS OF THE CANVASS
OF THE NOVEMBER 5, 2024,
GENERAL ELECTION

| | STATE OF CALIFORNIA | 7 |
|--------|--|--|
| | COUNTY OF Napa | ss. |
| | | |
| | section 15300, et seq., I did canvass the County on November 5, 2024, for me and that the Statement of Votes Cast, the County of Votes Cast, the Cast, the County of Votes Cast, the | , County Clerk/Registrar of Voters of County of certify that, in pursuance of the provisions of Elections Code the results of the votes cast in the General Election held in saic asures and contests that were submitted to the vote of the vote to which this certificate is attached is full, true, and correct. Al seal this 3rd day of December , 2024, at the |
| Seal f | COUNTY | County Clerk/Registrar of Voters County of Napa Stare of California |

Canvass Certification of Elections Official (11/2024)

APPENDIX E:

Napa County Report of 1% Manual Tally, page 1

| | MANUAL TALLY e section 15360] |
|---|--|
| County: Napa | |
| Election: 2024 Genera | al Election |
| Manual tally method used: 🚺 One Part [section 15360(a |)(1)] |
| Two Part [section 15360(a |)(2)] |
| Date and time notice provided (attach copy of the notice): | |
| 9/11/2024 6:07 PM | |
| Internet website where additional information about the ma | anual tally is posted, if applicable: |
| https://www.countyofnapa.org/2972/Ready-Set-Vo | ote |
| Date and time the manual tally commenced, beginning with after the close of the polls on Election Day): | the random selection of precincts and batches (must be |
| Random was drawn 11/5/2024 at 8:17 pm and be | gan manual tally on 11/22/2024 at 8:00 am |
| Date and time the manual tally finished: | |
| 11/26/2024 at 4:30 pm | |
| Estimated number of members of the public who observed | the process: |
| 4 | |
| Total number of ballots counted in this election (official cam | vass numbers): |
| Polling place / vote center ballots (including provisionals) | 4,851 |
| Vote-by-mail ballots | 61,783 |
| Total number of ballots manually tallied: | |
| Polling place / vote center ballots (including provisionals) | 241 |
| Vote-by-mail ballots | 3,356 |
| , | |

APPENDIX E:

Napa County Report of 1% Manual Tally, page 2

| Total number of precincts in the election | 204 |
|---|--|
| Total number of precincts selected for the manual tally | , 11 |
| Batches of vote-by-mail or provisional ballots (attach list Indicating whether ballots are polling place / vote center | t describing each batch with the number of ballots in each, r, vote-by-mail, or provisional): |
| Total number of batches in the election | |
| Total number of batches selected for the manual tally | N/A |
| Method used to choose precincts and batch of ballots to nethod); | o manually tally (include description of random selection |
| The job was generated by a volunteer norm the | public. This job selects 1% of precincts at random |
| and includes any additional precincts required t | to cover contests not initially included in the 1% sive and unbiased selection of precincts for our |
| and includes any additional precincts required to selection. This approach ensures a comprehen analysis. Description of any discrepancies noted (include details a | to cover contests not initially included in the 1% issive and unbiased selection of precincts for our ottach additional pages if necessa |
| and includes any additional precincts required to selection. This approach ensures a comprehen analysis. Description of any discrepancies noted (include details a | to cover contests not initially included in the 1% issive and unbiased selection of precincts for our ottach additional pages if necessar is bout each discrepancy and how each was resolved; also includes or anything that may improve the manual tally process): |
| and includes any additional precincts required to selection. This approach ensures a comprehen analysis. Description of any discrepancies noted (include details anything unusual observed during the manual tally process.) | to cover contests not initially included in the 1% issive and unbiased selection of precincts for our ottach additional pages if necessare is the second sec |
| and includes any additional precincts required to selection. This approach ensures a comprehen analysis. Description of any discrepancies noted (include details anything unusual observed during the manual tally process.) | to cover contests not initially included in the 1% issive and unbiased selection of precincts for our ottach additional pages if necessare is the second sec |
| and includes any additional precincts required to selection. This approach ensures a comprehen analysis. Description of any discrepancies noted (include details anything unusual observed during the manual tally process.) | to cover contests not initially included in the 1% sive and unbiased selection of precincts for our ottach additional pages if necessarishout each discrepancy and how each was resolved; also inclues or anything that may improve the manual tally process): |
| and includes any additional precincts required to selection. This approach ensures a comprehen analysis. Description of any discrepancies noted (include details anything unusual observed during the manual tally process.) | to cover contests not initially included in the 1% risive and unbiased selection of precincts for our ottach additional pages if necessar about each discrepancy and how each was resolved; also incluess or anything that may improve the manual tally process): in the Manual Tally. |
| and includes any additional precincts required to selection. This approach ensures a comprehen analysis. Description of any discrepancies noted (include details a nything unusual observed during the manual tally processing and the processing of | to cover contests not initially included in the 1% issive and unbiased selection of precincts for our ottach additional pages if necessal about each discrepancy and how each was resolved; also incluiess or anything that may improve the manual tally process): in the Manual Tally. attach additional pages if necessal |
| and includes any additional precincts required to selection. This approach ensures a comprehen analysis. Description of any discrepancies noted (include details a nything unusual observed during the manual tally process.) Napa County did not have any discrepancies of | to cover contests not initially included in the 1% issive and unbiased selection of precincts for our ottach additional pages if necessar about each discrepancy and how each was resolved; also incluress or anything that may improve the manual tally process): in the Manual Tally. attach additional pages if necessar |